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With this book Anne Brunon-Ernst has done a great service. As she notes in the 
General Introduction, hers is the first full-length study bringing the work of Jeremy 
Bentham together with that of Michel Foucault (1926-1984), to show how very important 
Bentham’s work was to Foucault’s analyses of modern power. Until now, too many 
readers would think of the relationship between Bentham and Foucault in terms of 
Panopticon: this narrow, disciplinary and often dirigiste focus has turned Bentham 
scholars off of Foucault and Foucault scholars off of Bentham. Instead, building on the 
work of Christian Laval and others, Brunon-Ernst shows how Foucault’s Collège de 
France lectures on biopolitics are inspired by an appreciation of utilitarianism as modern 
and flexible governmental rationality, informing and implementing actually existing 
liberalisms less on the basis of abstract right than on the basis of concrete instruments of 
security. Foucault recognized in Bentham a thinker for whom power was not so much 
top-down as lateral, and for whom law could be converted into a set of tactics of 
government that go well beyond the state, narrowly understood, to regulate population 
rather than territory, and to regulate individuals through their own freedom to act on and 
respond to incentives and disincentives. On this view utilitarianism is the anti-dirigiste 
framework for biopolitics; it is a ‘technology of government’ (p. 113) that provides the 
primary means and ends of liberal rule. 
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Between its Introduction and Epilogue (on language), Utilitarian Biopolitics is 
divided into three parts: 1) the biopolitics of interests (biopolitical pleasure and 
biopolitical pain, or sex and crime/punishment); 2) the utilitarian conduct of conduct 
(through laws, norms, and publicity); and 3) the biopolitical expert (the moralist and the 
economist). Brunon-Ernst aims to demonstrate not only the close affinities between 
Bentham’s schema and Foucault’s account of biopolitics (and thus the importance of 
Bentham to Foucault’s generation of this account), but to suggest what Bentham can 
learn from Foucault and what Foucault can learn from Bentham. For this reader, the first 
project is far more successful than the second: Brunon-Ernst offers close and compelling 
readings, for example, of the connections between Bentham’s direct and indirect 
legislation and Foucault’s government as conduct of conduct, and of the relationship 
between Bentham’s emphasis on economy and frugality and the role for Foucault of 
political-economic expertise in constituting the truths of biopolitical regimes. What 
seems strange about the second project—for example, Brunon-Ernst’s insistence that 
Foucault’s ‘bodies and pleasures’ needs Bentham’s utility and that Bentham’s theory of 
motivation needs Foucault’s analysis of instinct—is that it sidesteps the extent to which 
Bentham and Foucault were very different kinds of thinkers. Bentham was a resolutely 
non-historical critical projector, and Foucault a resolutely historicist skeptic; it’s not clear 
that either would or should have any interest in learning from the other, and the notion 
that they should seems to need more justification. Perhaps Brunon-Ernst is simply 
emulating Bentham’s constructivism, but such an approach risks misconstruing Foucault, 
and risks gliding over important differences between late Enlightenment and postwar 
twentieth-century contexts. These concerns and other more minor ones, however, do not 
UCL Bentham Project 
Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 15 (2013) 
 
3 
 
take away from Brunon-Ernst’s achievement. She has produced a piece of thorough and 
extensive scholarship, consulting a huge number of primary and secondary English and 
French sources; it should be impossible, following her work, for Bentham and Foucault 
scholars to dismiss each other as they have in the past. As she argues persuasively 
throughout, both camps need to get beyond Panopticon to reassess the illuminating 
relationship between these two thinkers. 
 
Stephen G. Engelmann, University of Illinois at Chicago 
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